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NOTES

BRIDGING THE (SIGNIFICANT) GAP: TO WHAT
EXTENT DOES THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
OF 1996 CONTEMPLATE SEAMLESS SERVICE?
Stephanie E. Niehaus*
INTRODUCTON

Since the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the
TCA or Act), an increasing number of personal wireless service
(PWS) 1 providers have attempted to break into the attractive and
highly profitable market for wireless service. The number of competing providers varies among locales; however, at least seventy-five percent of Americans currently can choose from at least five providers in
their area. 2 This increase in choice has been matched by an increase
in subscription rates. Between 1995 and 1999 alone, the number of
wireless subscriptions reached seventy-six million, meaning that thirty
8
percent of the population enjoys some level of wireless service.
While these numbers may seem impressive, a recent study by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2002; B.A., Georgetown
University, 1999. I would like to thank my father, for suggesting this topic, and my
mother, for patiently listening to our discussions. I would also like to thank Professor
John C. Nagle of the Notre Dame Law School for taking time on a spring afternoon to
read through my draft and for his insightful comments.
1 The TCA defines PWS as "commercial mobile services, unlicensed wireless
services, and common carrier wireless exchange access services." 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c) (7) (C) (i) (Supp. V 1999). This definition can be confusing as PWS encompasses several kinds of wireless technology. See infra Part I.B; infra notes 25-39 and
accompanying text.

2 ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYSUNITED STATES (2000), available at 2000 WL 26058316, at *47.
3 Id.
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indicates that the United States is falling far behind other developed
countries in the provision of telecommunications services. 4 Accord-

ing to the survey, "In 1995, the United States ranked fifth among
OECD countries in cellular penetration, but its ranking fell to sixteenth in 1999." 5 Among the reasons suggested for this statistical

drop are the availability of pre-paid phone cards and free incoming
calls in foreign markets. 6 While the addition of these options certainly would make wireless service more attractive to American users,
one of the more pressing concerns of PWS providers in the United
States is an incomplete telecommunications infrastructure.
One side-effect to providers of an incomplete infrastructure is
the inability to provide seamless coverage to consumers. Gaps in coverage result in dropped calls, or the inability to place or receive calls,
in certain pockets of a PWS provider's coverage area that fall outside
the range of a wireless facility. 7 As one author aptly noted,
More antenna sites [are] required to provide reliable service to all
areas of the country if we are to develop a smooth, seamless information highway. Gaps in service, like potholes on a highway, must
be filled to allow voice, data, video and Internet traffic to travel
smoothly and quickly through the nation's information
infrastructure. 8
These coverage gaps are not only inconvenient and annoying for consumers of wireless technology, but also raise personal security issues,
for example, for long-distance travelers who rely on cellular service in
case of a breakdown or an emergency.
PWS providers often find that for technological and geographical
reasons they must construct new towers to provide service to the area
affected by the gap. If the ideal site for the new tower is not zoned for
telecommunications facilities or a local ordinance restricts the placement of telecommunications facilities, the providers must apply to local zoning authorities for variances, special exceptions, or other
4 See id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at *47-*48. Another notable difference between telecommunications in
the United States and other countries is that in many foreign countries land line use
is significantly more expensive than it is in the United States. Thus in many foreign
countries, consumers may find it more economical to rely solely on a mobile phone
rather than a land line. For Americans on the other hand, a mobile phone is an
expensive alternative to a traditional land line, and few consumers rely solely on mobile phones for communication. See id. at *48.
7 See infra Part III.A.
8 Gregory D. Meese, Filling Potholes in the Information Highway, N.J. Lmw., June
1999, at 19, 26.

2002]

BRIDGING THE (SIGNIFICANT)

GAP

permission to construct the proposed facilities. If the local zoning au-

thority rejects the application, the parties may find themselves in
court, embroiled in expensive and time-consuming litigation. Much
of this litigation revolves around the proper construction of the terms
of the TCA regulating municipal zoning authority over the placement
of telecommunications facilities. 9
Congress enacted the TCA in an attempt to facilitate deregulation of the telecommunications industry and to encourage competition. 10 When President Clinton signed the bill into law, he remarked
that the TCA "is truly revolutionary legislation that will bring the future to our doorstep.... [By enacting the TCA] our laws will catch up
with our future. We will help to create an open marketplace where
competition and innovation can move as quickly as light."1 ' To further this goal of an open marketplace, § 332 of the Act limits the traditional authority of municipal zoning boards to review applications
from PWS providers for the construction of PWS facilities within mu12
nicipal boundaries.
Specifically, the Act imposes five express limitations on local authorities, three of which are substantive and two of which are procedural.' 3 Two of the substantive limitations-the "unreasonable
discrimination clause" and the "prohibition clause"14-have inspired
massive amounts of litigation. The Act states, in relevant part:
(7) Preservation of local zoning authority.
(A) General authority. Except as provided in this paragraph,
nothing in this Chapter [47 U.S.C. §§151-6156] shall limit
or affect the authority of a State or local government or

instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless

service facilities.
(B) Limitations.
(i) The regulation of the placement, construction, and
modification of personal wireless service facilities by
any State or local government or instrumentality
thereof9 See infra Part III.
10 See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
11 Remarks on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 185,
186 (Feb. 8, 1996) [hereinafter Remarks].

12 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (B) (Supp. V 1999).
13 See id. § 332(c) (7) (B) (i)-(v). See generally Matthew N. McClure, Comment,
Working Through the Static: Is There Anything Left to Local Control in the Siting of Cellular

and PCS Towers After the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996?, 44 Vim. L. REv. 781, 788-89
(1999) (discussing the TCA's substantive and procedural requirements).
14 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (I)-(II).
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(I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services; and
(II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.
A State or local government or instrumentality
thereof shall act on any request for authorization to
place, construct, or modify personal wireless service
facilities within a reasonable period of time after the
request is duly filed with such government or instrumentality, taking into account the nature and scope
of such request.
Any decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities
shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.
No State or local government or instrumentality
thereof may regulate the placement, construction,
and modification of personal wireless service facilities
on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities
comply with the Commission's regulations concerning
such emissions.
Any person adversely affected by any final action or
failure to act by a State or local government or any
instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with this
subparagraph may, within 30 days after such action or
failure to act, commence an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction. The court shall hear and decide such action on an expedited basis. Any person
adversely affected by an act or failure to act by a State
or local government or any instrumentality thereof
that is inconsistent with clause (iv) may petition the
15
Commission for relief.

In particular, § 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II)-the prohibition clause-is almost always implicated in litigation springing from attempts to fill significant gaps in coverage. This litigation, and the underlying issues,
provide the focus for this Note.
Practitioners, municipal zoning boards, PWS providers, and,
eventually, state and federal courts have attempted to interpret the
arguably ambiguous provisions of the TCA since its enactment in
1996. The debate involves the standard question of federalism: where
does (or should) federal control end and local control begin? As
15

Id. § 332(c)(7)(A)-(B).
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often is the case when this question emerges, the courts are split on

the answer, with some circuits construing the TCA provisions broadly
(thus favoring municipal zoning boards),16 and other circuits reading
the provisions narrowly (thus favoring providers). 17 This Note will
deal with this conflict by concentrating on recent cases involving PWS
providers' attempts to remedy significant gaps in their coverage areas,
and the corresponding decisions of municipal zoning boards to deny
the providers' applications to fill such gaps. The resulting position is
that these denials potentially violate the prohibition clause, based on
the plain meaning of § 332, the legislative purpose of the TCA, and
the relevant case law.
Part I of this Note attempts to explain the relevant technological
aspects of wireless telecommunications, including a brief historical
sketch of the development of telecommunications services over the
past century. Part I also includes a discussion of the complicated technological considerations that affect wireless tower placement, which is
necessary as a background for understanding the debate between
providers and municipalities. Part II explores the meaning and purpose of § 332 of the TCA, focusing particularly on the section's substantive limitations. Part III provides an extensive discussion of recent
caselaw centering on the prohibition clause of § 332. Part III begins
with an explanation of the significant gap problem, including the
courts' attempts to define the problem and the problem itself within
the context of § 332. Part III then addresses the circuit split, beginning with a discussion of the "foundational cases" and concluding
with an in-depth analysis of the various tests the courts have created
for dealing with significant gaps under § 332. Finally, Part III considers the development of the issue in the Third Circuit, which best illustrates the confusion and dissension created by § 332. In Part IV, this
Note argues that the Second Circuit's standard, initially adopted by
the Third Circuit, is the most accurate reading of the prohibition
clause, but that recent developments in the Third Circuit have skewed
the standard and changed its practical effect. Because of the confu16

For example see AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423 (4th

Cir. 1998), discussed infra Part III.B.
17 For example see Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630 (2d Cir. 1999),
discussed infra Part III.B. Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court recently
denied certiorari in a case out of the Third Circuit: Omnipoint CommunicationsEnterprises v. Newtown Township, 531 U.S. 985 (2000). In its petition, Omnipoint urged the
Court to resolve the growing circuit split, arguing that none of the four circuits that
have decided this issue have applied an acceptable test. Omnipoint Commun. Enter.
v. Newtown Township, 219 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W.
3175, at 7 (U.S. Sept. 6, 2000) (No. 00-353) [hereinafter Omnipoint Petition].
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sion between and within the circuits, this Note takes the position that
the significant gap issue is ripe for Supreme Court review.
I.

TECHNOLOGY

Because the technological requirements for cellular service are
complicated, a rudimentary understanding of the way wireless technology works is necessary in order to appreciate the many factors that
a PWS provider must consider in determining where and how to site a
new tower.
A.

History

Wireless technology has been available since after the Second
World War.' 8 However, practical delivery of this technology to the
consumer market was not possible for nearly thirty years following
WWII;19 in fact, wireless service as we know it was not introduced to
the public until the 1970s, when two significant breakthroughs occurred. The first breakthrough came in 1973, when Motorola began
marketing a personal radiotelephone set called the DynaTAC mobile
phone. 20 Then, in 1977 the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) stepped in to encourage further development by opening up
the 800 to 900 MHz portion of the radio spectrum to cellular
21
providers.
The FCC's move was experimental and was not intended to fully
deregulate the market. Rather, the FCC capped the number of possible licenses in each service area at two: the first was automatically
awarded to the local telephone company, and the second was awarded
to a competing provider through a lottery system. 22 However, the
18 World of Wireless Communications, The History of Wireless, at http://wivw.ivowcom.com/consumer/FAQ/articles.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2001) (on file with author). "The strategic value of wireless communication on the battlefield spurred companies like AT&T, Motorola and General Electric to focus on refining mobile and
portable communications. Motorola's FM Handie-Talkie and Walkie-Talkie figured

prominently among the products developed during the war years and carried over
into peacetime use." Id.
19 See id.
20 Id.
21 See Kenneth C. Baldwin, The TelecommunicationsAct of 1996: Developing Caselaw
of Towering Propositions,31 URB. LAW. 555, 557 (1999); see also Lynn Hanley, Note,
Wireless Communications and the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996: An Experiment in Federalism, 12 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 48, 51 (1999) ("The [FCC] has the exclusive responsibility and authority to assign and distribute sections of the radio frequency spectrum
and otherwise regulate the use of the spectrum.").
22 Baldwin, supranote 21, at 557. The local telephone company was known as the
"A" side carrier, and the competing provider was known as the "B" side carrier. World
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inefficiency of this system was readily apparent as potential competitive providers flooded the FCC with applications. As a result, in 1994
the FCC announced that it would begin sectioning off the relevant
portion of the radio spectrum to as many as nine cellular providers
per market area through an open-bidding process. 23 The FCC's announcement fanned the competitive flames as providers dumped billions of dollars into the federal treasury to acquire licenses and set up
shop in market areas across the country, bringing new technology to
24
American consumers.
B.

Types of PWS

Although used broadly to refer to mobile telephones, the term
"cellular" does not accurately describe all forms of wireless service.
Rather, cellular technology accounts for only one type of PWS. A second and more sophisticated technology-personal communications
systems (PCS)-is also available to consumers of wireless products. 26
To further complicate matters, cellular can be broken down again
into analog and digital technologies. The distinction is important because these three technologies often operate together and compete in
the same markets.
1. Cellular Technology
When a customer initiates a call using cellular technology, his or
her voice signal is transmitted by radio waves to a receiving antenna,
usually mounted on a tower, pole, or other high structure. 26 Unlike
commercial radio station transmissions, which are high-power and
one-directional, cellular transmissions require smaller (and therefore
of Wireless Communications, supra note 18. In 1983, AT&T received the first competing license in Chicago. Id.
23 Baldwin, supra note 21, at 557; see also World of Wireless Communications,
supra note 18 (discussing FCC licensing divisions). The FCC also began auctioning
off PCS licenses in 1994, further expanding the market. Currently, the FCC has auctioned off the entire 120 MHz of the spectrum available for Broadband PCS. FCC,
Broadband PCS Fact Sheet, http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/pcs/bbfctsh.html (last modified
Aug. 30, 2001) (on file with author); see also infra Part I.B.2 for further discussion of
PCS technology.
24 FCC, supra note 23. According to the FCC, Broadband PCS licensing auctions
in 1994 and 1995 forA and B Block licenses (covering 51 Major Trading Areas) alone
generated $7.7 billion for the United States Treasury. Id.
25 See Hanley, supra note 21, at 49.
26 See SAN DIEGo ASS'N OF Gov'Ts, WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES ISSUES
http://ww.sandag.cog.ca.us/ftp/html/publications/wirePAPER, pt. I (1995),
less.html (on file with author) [hereinafter IssuEs PAPER].
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more) antennas to provide point-to-point, low-power, two-way communications. 27 The antenna receives the signal and then routes the call
by microwave or landline to the telephone network. 28 As the caller
moves through the area, the signal is "handed off' to surrounding
29
antennas until the caller ends the transmission.
Analog technology was the first and most basic form of cellular
technology available to the consumer public.30 It also provides the
lowest quality transmission.3 1 With analog service, the voice signal is
electronically reproduced and amplified as it bounces from tower to
tower.3 2 As a result of the amplification, however, the transmission is
33
often interrupted by outside noises and static.
Digital service is the more advanced cellular technology and provides a much higher quality transmission. Unlike analog, with digital
service the caller's voice is broken up into binary digits that correspond with various sounds at different points in time.3 4 By avoiding
27 See Gregory Tan, Note, Wading Through the Rhetoric of the TelecommunicationsAct
of 1996: Uncertaintyof Local ZoningAuthority over Wireless Telecommunications Tower Siting,
22 VT. L. REV. 461, 465-66 (1997). To achieve two-way communication, transmissions
between the antenna and the mobile unit are conducted on a two-frequency channel;
transmissions to the antenna operate on one frequency, while transmissions from the
antenna operate on the other. See Int'l Eng'g Consortium, Web ProForums, Cellular
Communications Tutorial, Topic 1, at http://-v.iec.org/online/tutorials/
cell-comm/index.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2001) (on file with author).
28 See Hanley, supra note 21, at 49-50.
29 See id. at 50. Cellular towers cover an area of approximately ten miles, depending on the surrounding landscape. Id.
30 See Int'l Eng'g Consortium, supra note 27, at Topic 4.
31 See id. ("Limitations associated with AMPS [analog cellular technology] include: 1. low calling capacity; 2. limited spectrum; 3. no room for spectrum growth; 4.
poor data communications; 5. minimal privacy; 6. inadequate fraud protection.").
32 See Tim Race, What Do They Mean by Digital,Anyhow?, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 19, 1998,
at G1l ("A basic example of analog technology is the conventional telephone, in
which sound waves are converted into a fluctuating electrical pattern analogous to the
original sound waves. This principle-analogous electronic patterns-holds true
whether sound is traveling over wires or via radio frequencies."); see also IssuEs PAPER,
supra note 26, at pt. II.
33 See IssuEs PAPER, supra note 26, at pt. II.
34 See id.; see also Race, supra note 32.
In the case of digital technology, information detectable by human ears or
eyes is converted into an electronic pattern expressible as the digits of a
computer code. This code typically uses a simple binary system of zeroes
and ones, which can also be expressed as "on" and "off" in an electrical current ....
Information can be captured and reproduced digitally with much
more precision than with analog technology, and it can be compressed and
stored in a much smaller physical format.
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the amplification process, digital telecommunications also avoid
problems with background noise, resulting in a much clearer signal.3 5
More importantly, digital technology reduces the strain on the cellular infrastructure by compressing the voice signals, thus eliminating
natural pauses and increasing calling capacity on the portion of the
36
radio spectrum that the signal is using.

2.

Personal Communications Systems Technology

Personal Communications Systems make up the other side of
PWS. Like cellular technology, PCS can be broken down into two subcategories, narrowband and broadband; however, only broadband
PCS competes with cellular technology in the wireless communications market.3 7 Unlike traditional cellular technology, PCS offers a
huge range of potential services. According to the FCC, broadband
PCS
could.., be used in the development of more advanced wireless
phone services that would be able to pinpoint the subscriber in any
given locale. Broadband PCS will most likely be used to provide a
variety of mobile services including an entire family of new communications devices utilizing very small, lightweight, multi-function
portable phones, portable facsimile and other imaging devices, new
types of multi-function cordless phones, and advanced devices with
two-way data capabilities. Broadband PCS systems will be able to
communicate with other telephone networks as well as with personal digital assistants, allowing subscribers to send and receive data
and/or video messages without connection to a wire.38
Although PCS relies on the same technology as digital cellular
telecommunications, it operates at a higher frequency than cellular
service; thus, while PCS improves technology, it requires more and
often taller antennas to operate properly.3 9 The number of towers
needed to effectively provide service thus depends on the technology
the service is using and has significant bearing on siting decisions regarding cell placement.
26, at pt. II.
See Tan, supra note 27, at 470-71.
37 See Hanley, supranote 21, at 50-51. Messaging services and paging operate on
narrowband PCS. Id.
38 FCC, supra note 23.
39 See Sara A. Evans, Note, Wireless Service Providers v. Zoning Commissions: Preservation of State and Local ZoningAuthority Under the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996,32 GA. L.
REv. 965, 980-81 (1998). Broadband PCS uses the 1850 to 1990 MHz band of the
radio spectrum. See FCC, supra note 23.
35

36

See IssuEs PAPER, supra note

NOTRE

C.

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 77:2

Cell Configuration and Frequency Reuse

The cell is the basic geographic component of the wireless communications infrastructure, regardless of the technology used. 40 Each
cell is organized around a base station, which includes the supporting
structure for an antenna, 41 the actual antenna, and the peripheral
equipment. 42 For obvious reasons, cells are crucial components of a
provider's service; as a result, providers must give careful consideration to cell placement. 4 3 Many factors influence cell placement decisions, including topography, subscriber density, and the type of
44
technology available in the service area in question.
Cell size is partially determined by the subscriber density in the
surrounding area; for example, in rural areas, where the subscriber
density is low, cells tend to be larger, as opposed to urban areas, where
cells tend to be quite small. 45 However, subscriber density is not the
only determining factor for cell size; rather, the type of wireless service
offered-analog, digital, or PCS-also impacts cell sizing.4 6 An analog cell has a comparatively large radius, averaging two to five miles in
urban areas and five to eight miles in rural areas; as a result, analog
47
service requires a small number of large cells to operate properly.
On the other hand, PCS technology utilizes microcells and
macrocells, both with under a two mile radius. 48 "Consequently, some
40 Int'l Eng'g Consortium, supra note 27, at Topic 3 ("The term cellular comes
from the honeycomb shape of the areas [i.e., the cells] into which a coverage region
is divided.") (emphasis in original).
41 Tan, supra note 27, at 476.
There are three commonly used types of antenna support structures: lattice
towers, monopoles, and building-attached facilities. Lattice towers are structures consisting of three or four legs connected by a lattice pattern of supporting beams .... Monopoles are structures consisting of a single pole,
approximately three feet in diameter at its base and tapering to about 1.5
feet in diameter at the top ....Building-attached antennas.., occur in two
general forms: roof-mounted and building-mounted. Antennas have also
been known to be mounted on silos, water tanks, Windmills, or smokestacks.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
42 Id. at 475.
43 See id. at 474. "The actual positioning of base stations within the model cell
structure is essential to the success of the network." Id.
44 See Tan, supranote 27, at 474; Int'l Eng'g Consortium, supranote 27, at Topic
3.
45 Int'l Eng'g Consortium, supra note 27, at fig.6.
46 Tan, supra note 27, at 474.
47 Id.
48 See id.; see also IssuEs PAPER, supra note 26, at pt. II (describing how PCS technology uses "microcells (antennas located on top of light poles or telephone poles),
and macrocells (antennas mounted on the sides or tops of buildings)").
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PCS providers estimate that PCS networks will require two to three
'49
times as many transmission sites as cellular networks.
Another consideration influencing cell configuration is the position of the base station within the cell. The optimal location for a
base station is at the center of the cell; however, due to geographic
constraints, optimal placement is not always possible. 50 Nonetheless,
the base station must be placed within one-fourth of the total cell radius away from the optimal center for the system of cells to operate. 51
Theoretically, if cells are arranged properly, wireless telephone
users will be able to travel throughout a service area without disruption to a phone call. This uninterrupted service is possible because of
a process known as "handoff."52 "Handoff occurs when the mobile
telephone network automatically transfers a call from radio channel
to radio channel as a mobile crosses adjacent cells."5 3 The caller does

not even notice the transition; however, the transfer is necessary because no two adjacent cells have the same channel assignment.5 4 The
difference in channels between cells is a product of the very necessary
concept of "frequency reuse."
Frequency reuse developed because the radio spectrum available
for commercial licensing is limited.5 5 As a result, wireless providers
had to develop a way to maximize the number of communications
that could be carried on a single channel at a given time. 56 The concept that developed is called "frequency reuse" or "frequency planning."15 7 Essentially, frequency reuse refers to the process of assigning
and reassigning available radio channels across a series of hexagonal
shaped cells. 58 These cells are arranged in adjacent, honeycomb-

shaped "clusters," which are laid out across the service area to provide
seamless coverage. 59 To minimize interference and maximize channel use, cells are organized so that other cells with the same channel
49 Tan, supra note 27, at 474.
50
51
52

See id.
Id.
See Int'l Eng'g Consortium, supra note 27, at fig.7.

53 Id. at Topic 3.
54 Id.
55 IssuEs PAPER, supra note 26, at pt. II ("The cellular telephone industry is limited to 45 MHz of spectrum bandwidth, which without frequency-reuse, would limit
each cellular carrier to 396 frequencies or voice channels.").
56 See Tan, supra note 27, at 468.
57 See Int'l Eng'g Consortium, supra note 27, at Topic 3.
58 Tan, supra note 27, at 468. See generally Int'l Eng'g Consortium, supra note 27,
at fig.5 (depicting hexagonal cell arrangement).
59 Int'l Eng'g Consortium, supra note 27, at Topic 3.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 77:2

assignment, or "footprint," are far enough away that the signals do not
60
interfere.
Ideally, a PWS provider would be able to locate the optimal locations for base stations and install the necessary facilities to create a
pattern of adjacent cells and clusters throughout an entire service
area. In this way, wireless carriers could offer uninterrupted service to
customers. However, technology considerations do not always coincide with zoning restrictions, and what may be an optimal location for
the provider may not be an optimal location for the municipality.
Providers often encounter resistance from local zoning authorities
and citizens who oppose the construction of telecommunications towers for, inter alia, aesthetic, health, and safety reasons. Indeed, zoning
boards often cite community concerns to support a decision to reject
a siting application. 6' And community concerns are not surprising
62
considering the sometimes unsightly appearance of wireless towers
and the numerous studies linking wireless telephone use to health
63
problems.
60 Id. The concept of frequency reuse is difficult and may be better explained by
the following, simplified example:
In Cleveland, radio station WMMS broadcasts at frequency 100.7 of the FM
spectrum. If you travel to other cities around the country, you will also find
other radio stations that broadcast at frequency 100.7. All of the stations are
broadcasting at the same frequency, but because they are geographically dispersed, they do not interfere with each other's broadcast. Each cellular
tower is like a radio station. It broadcasts at certain frequencies, but unlike a
radio station, a cellular tower will broadcast at many frequencies. Each
tower is tuned to broadcast at frequencies that will not interfere with surrounding towers. This enables the network of towers to reuse the same frequency that one tower is using without interfering with the towers that are
also using that frequency.
E-mail from James B. Niehaus, Esq., Frantz Ward L.L.P., to Stephanie E. Niehaus
(Oct. 23, 2000) (on file with author).
61 See, e.g., Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 492 (2d Cir.
1999); PrimeCo Pers. Commun., L.P. v. Vill. of Fox Lake, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1052,
1064-66 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Omnipoint Commun., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 767 A.2d
488, 494-95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
62 See Laurie Dichiara, Wireless CommunicationsFacilities:Sitingfor Sore Eyes, 6 Burr.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 13 (1998) (noting that "wireless facilities are typically designed with
function, not appearance, as the primary goal").
63 See Nick Tinari, Cell Phone Towers in ResidentialAreas: Did Congress Let the Pig in
the Parlorwith the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 269, 276 n.43
(2000) (referencing studies that show "that low level radiation at cell phone frequencies can cause damage to DNA molecules associated with Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson's disease, and cancer"); Jeneba Jalloh, Comment, Local Tower Siting Preemption:
FCCRadio Frequency GuidelinesAre Solutionfor RemovingBarriersto PCS Expansion, 5 CoMMLAW CONSPEcrus 113, 119 (1997) ("A national opinion poll.., found that an over-
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Section 332(c) (7) (B) (iv) of the Act specifically preempts a local
zoning board's ability to deny a siting application based solely on
health and environmental concerns. 64 Rather than leave the determination to local authorities, the TCA relies on the FCC to establish acceptable levels of radio frequency emissions for wireless towers. If a
provider complies with these standards, the TCA prohibits a municipality from denying the provider's application without an alternate
(and acceptable) reason. 65 On the other hand, the TCA does not address aesthetics, and several courts have allowed denials based partly
on aesthetic concerns. 66 These concerns generally relate to the visibility of the structure above the tree line and the effect the structure will
have on property values and the "character" of the surrounding
neighborhood.

67

When community concerns arise, alternative arrangements are
sometimes possible; for example, a provider may choose to mount an
antenna on an existing structure or camouflage the structure by design or with vegetation. Still, these proposals often meet with equal
whelming majority of those polled cited health fears as the cause of their opposition
to cellular tower [sic] in their neighborhoods.").
64 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (B) (iv) (Supp. V 1999). Specifically, the provision states:
"No state or local government or instrumentality thereof may regulate the placement,
construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities on the basis of
environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities
comply with the Commission's regulations concerning such emissions." Id. Although
the TCA preempts local authority over health and environmental matters, public debate on the potential harmful effects of wireless towers and telephone use continues.
Because "three wireless communications sources ... generate and use electromagnetic energy"-namely "cell site antennas, hand-held portable communications devices, and electrical equipment in equipment buildings at cell sites and switching
stations"-some members of the public have voiced concern as to "whether the type
of energy emitted by these systems affect [sic] human cells and cause [sic] illnesses."
ISSUES PAPER, supra note 26, at pt. IV.
65 See Tinari, supra note 63, at 276.
66 See Omnipoint, 767 A.2d at 498 ("Although the tower would look like a light
pole, its design did not change the fact that it would be much higher than the surrounding treetops and nearby structures."); cf Va. Metronet, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 984 F. Supp. 966, 974-76 (E.D. Va. 1998) (overruling zoning board's decision to
deny a siting application where four of the five stated reasons for the denial were
based on aesthetic concerns).
67 See Mariah E. Murphy, Note, A Proposalfor Achieving Consistency in the Implementation of the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, and MaintainingLocal Land Use Laws, 19
TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 205, 206 (2001) ("The towers are stand alone structures
that range in height from fifty to two hundred feet ....
[Tlhey pose an eyesore,
lower property values, and are popping up where they are unwanted, in residential
and rural districts.").
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resistance or are not feasible because of siting considerations. 68 The
TCA anticipates this potential for conflict between local authorities
and wireless providers in § 332 by expressly preserving local authority, 69 while simultaneously constraining that authority through the
substantive and procedural limitations contained in § 332(c) (7) (B).
II.

THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: THE PLAIN MEANING
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE

Section 332(c) (7) of the TCA both preserves and limits local zoning authority over the placement of cellular structures within municipal boundaries. As one court noted,
Section 332 seeks to strike a balance between encouraging the
growth of telecommunications systems and the right of local governments to make land use decisions. This balance is sought to be
achieved by giving weight to the recognized importance of seamless
wireless coverage as well as the right of local governments to make
land use decisions.

70

This Note is concerned primarily with the second part of the first substantive limitation of § 332, which prevents municipal zoning boards
from taking any action that prohibits or has "the effect of prohibiting
the provision of personal wireless services" (the "prohibition
clause"). 7 1 This provision can be read in two ways: (1) based on the
plain meaning of the statute, and (2) against the backdrop of the legislative purpose.
A.

The Plain Language Reading of the Prohibition Clause

Although the provision consists of a relatively few number of
words, the prohibition clause alone has inspired volumes of academic
speculation and case law. 72 The debate boils down to a semantical
exercise centered on the proper construction of the phrase "prohibit
or have the effect of prohibiting."7 3 Essentially, the prohibition clause
68 See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 635 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The
antennae may be placed on preexisting structures such as a building or billboard. But
absent suitable preexisting structures within 25% of the cell radius, it is necessary to
erect a tower for the antennae.").
69 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
70

N.Y. SMSA, L.P. v. Town of Riverhead, 118 F. Supp. 2d 333, 340 (E.D.N.Y.

2000).
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).
72 See Tan, supra note 27, at 464 (arguing that the prohibition clause is
"[p] erhaps the most ambiguous limitation" of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (B)).
71

73

Id. at 479.
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evokes two plain meanings. It could be read as an extension of
"prohibit," or it could be read independently. If read as an extension of "prohibit," the phrase "effect of prohibiting" builds upon
"prohibit" and, thus, encompasses any actions that have the effect of
a total ban on cellular towers .... Alternatively, if read independently, the plain meaning of the phrase "effect of prohibiting"... is
no longer limited to the figurative or geographical scope of "prohibit." Instead, it includes any regulatory action that prevents a particular company from providing its personal wireless services in any
74
geographical area.
Whether or not one accepts that both interpretations are possible, the independent reading is the more sensible. While acknowledging that legislation is not always clearly written, construing the
prohibition clause to proscribe only absolute bans on wireless service
would render the "effect of prohibiting" language redundant. As the
Second Circuit has noted, "[i]t is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that... 'interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous' [are disfavored]."75 Because the only way to give the latter
half of the prohibition clause any effect is to read the provision independently, the restriction on municipal authority contained in the
prohibition clause must extend beyond general policies banning wireless service.
B.

47 U.S. C. § 332-Legislative Purpose

While the plain language of the statute is arguably ambiguous,
the legislative history gives an unambiguous account of Congress's intention in passing the TCA. Former FCC Chairman William E. Kennard's reflections on the purpose of the TCA are particularly
insightful:
When figuring out what sort of telecommunications framework to
establish for our country as it entered the 21st century, Congress
wisely reached back to a value as old as America itself: choice. The
idea that once given an array of options, individuals can best decide
what is best for them. Thus, Congress gave the FCC the tools to
76
break open the monopoly markets to competition.
74

Id. (footnotes omitted).

75 Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 640 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting
Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992)); see also infra note 127 and
accompanying text.
76 William E. Kennard, The Telecom Act at Three: Seeing the Face of the Future,
Address at the Comptel 1999 Annual Meeting and Trade Exposition (Feb. 8, 1999), in
1999 FCC LEXIS 506, at *5.
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This preference for "choice" is reflected in the legislative documents
leading up to the signing of the bill,77 statements made contempora-

neously with the actual signing of the TCA,78 the preamble to the Act
itself,7 9 and numerous court cases interpreting the Act.8 0 Generally,
these statements reflect the idea that "[t]he goal [of the TCA] ... is to
encourage competition that will produce innovative technologies for
every American household and provide benefits to the American consumer in the form of lower prices and enhanced services." 8'
At the same time it sought to encourage competition in the telecommunications industry, Congress recognized the legitimate interest
of local communities in maintaining some control over zoning decisions regarding antenna placement.8 2 rn fact, Congress refused to
bend to pressure from PWS providers, who lobbied for complete preemption of local authority.8 3 Despite Congress's refusal to fully preempt local zoning authority, the legislative history, as well as the plain
reading of the substantive and procedural limitations contained in the
Act, indicate that Congress anticipated that zoning boards would allow wireless providers to access and effectively compete in the market
84
and would not unreasonably discriminate against providers.
77 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. H1145-46 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Linder).
This legislation will be remembered as the most deregulatory telecommunications legislation in history. The philosophy of this Congress-and our Nation in general-is to encourage competition in order to provide more
efficient service and superior products to the American consumer. This bill
will strip away antiquated laws, create more choices, and lower prices for
consumers and enable companies to compete in the new telecommunications marketplace.
Id.
78 See Remarks, supra note 11, at 186.
79 SeeTelecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (The
purpose of the Act is "Et]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order to
secure lower prices and higher quality service for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies.").
80 See, e.g., PrimeCo Pers. Commun., L.P. v. Vill. of Fox Lake, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1052,
1058 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Town of Easton, 982 F. Supp. 47, 50 (D.
Mass. 1997) ("The legislative history evidences clear Congressional intent to take
'down the barriers' to telecommunications."); Paging, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals,
957 F. Supp. 805, 807 (W.D. Va. 1997); BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Gwinnett County,
944 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Ga. 1996) ("TCA is expansive legislation designed primarily to increase competition in the telecommunications industry.").
81 142 CONG. REc. Hi146.
82 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (A) (Supp. V 1999).
83 See Evans, supra note 39, at 981.
84 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996).
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THE PROBLEM OF SIGNIFICANT GAPS IN RECENT CASE LAW

The boardroom, and later courtroom, battles between municipal
zoning boards and providers multiplied rapidly after the passage of
the TCA. Initially, the cases interpreting § 332 focused on the level of
federal preemption contemplated by the Act, as well as the general
implications of the substantive and procedural limitations contained
in § 332(c) (7) (B).85 Specifically with regard to the prohibition
clause, the courts were faced time and again with the task of determining whether municipal moratoria or general bans on wireless applications were lawful under the TCA.86 As the minutia of these cases was
sorted out, a general consensus emerged that such policies were impermissible. 87 However, the issue did not stay out of the courts for
long. With the decisions in their favor, providers sought to improve
service by expanding the wireless infrastructure to fill coverage gaps. 88
Again, problems arose as zoning boards hesitated to approve further
construction of wireless facilities in their neighborhoods. So the parties found themselves back in court, this time with "a subtler, and
more troubling issue . . . whether a single decision by a municipality
rejecting a tower siting could be construed as either prohibiting, or
The intent of the conferees is to ensure that a State or local government
does not in making a decision regarding the placement, construction and
modification of facilities of personal wireless services... unreasonably favor
one competitor over another... . Actions taken by State or local governments shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the placement,
construction oi- modification of personal wireless services. It is the intent of
this section that bans or policies that have the effect of banning personal
wireless services or facilities not be allowed and that decisions be made on a
case-by-case basis.

Id.
85

See generally Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v.Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. 1457 (N.D.
preemption and the prohibition and discrimination

Ala. 1997) (examining federal

clauses); Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Wash.

1996) (same); see also generally Shannon L. Lopata, Note, Monumental Changes: Stalling
Tactics and Moratoriaon Cellular Tower Siting,'77 WASH. U. L.Q. 193 (1999) (providing
general background on the problem of moratoria and court responses to such measures); McClure, supra note 13 (examining the breadth of § 332(c) (7) (B) limitations); Tan, supra note 27 (examining the meaning of the prohibition clause).
86 See, e.g., Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. at 1466-67 (holding that the institution
of a moratorium violates the TCA); Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Town of Farmington,
3:97 GV 863 (GLG), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15832, at *17-*20 (D. Conn. Oct. 6, 1997)
(same); cf City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. at 1036 (upholding a moritorium of limited
scope).
87 See supra note 86.
88 See generallyJamesLawlor, Act Two for Telecommunications,PLANNING, Sept. 1999,
at 16.
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effectively prohibiting, personal wireless services within the meaning
of the Act."8 9
The question breaks down into two main issues. First, the courts
must determine what qualifies as a significant gap in coverage. Second, the courts must determine if and how decisions by zoning boards
to deny providers' applications to remedy these gaps implicate the
substantive limitations of § 332. Perhaps not surprisingly, the federal
courts are split on the answer to this question.
A.

The Problem

As discussed in Part I.C., cells must be configured such that effective "handoff' can occur as users move in and out of the coverage area
of a given antenna. One court explained:
If the distance between [the antennae] is too great, then "coverage
gaps" occur. Coverage gaps significantly impair wireless service not
only for people in the immediate area of the gap, but also for other
customers because existing towers must then handle the "overflow"
by relaying signals that should be-according to the honeycomb
grid-transmitted via a non-existent tower. Additionally, in the coverage-gap [sic] area customers can neither initiate nor receive cellular telephone calls, and when customers travel through a gap area
their calls are disconnected. 90
Obviously, coverage gaps are a source of frustration for consumers,
who expect that communications initiated from a mobile telephone
will be completed and, once completed, will be sustained for the duration of the communication. The problem is equally frustrating for
providers, who stand to lose business if they cannot provide sufficient
coverage to customers.
According to the Fourth Circuit, the TCA "obviously cannot require that wireless services provide 100% coverage. In recognition of
this reality, federal regulations contemplate the existence of dead
spots, defined as 'small areas within a service area where the field
89 Paul J. Yesawich III & Anne Dyring Riley, Second Circuit Rejects "Attractively Simple" Interpretation of Siting Provisions in Telecommunications Act of 1996, METRO. CORP.
COUNS., Dec. 1999, at 21, 21.
90 PrimeCo Pers. Commun., L.P. v. Vill. of Fox Lake, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1054
(N.D. Ill. 1998); see also Cellular Tel. Co.v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 492 (2d

Cir. 1999) ("If a network contains too few cell sites or sites too far apart from one
another, customers living or working in or traveling through these 'coverage gaps'
experience inadequate service, including static, inability to place calls and mid-call
disconnection."); Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. at 1460 (likening cell structure to an
"interconnected quilt" in which "cells must be stitched together to provide seamless
coverage").
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strength is lower than the minimum level for reliable service."' 9 1
While it may be true that the TCA does not require 100% coverage, its
express goal of facilitating competition surely contemplates more
than scanty service from one or two providers, interrupted by significant gaps that are characterized not by unreliableservice, but rather by
nonexistent service.
The courts have attempted to differentiate a significant gap from
a mere dead spot. Generally, the analysis seems to turn on a factual
evaluation of the existing service. The Third Circuit, for example, has
declined to provide a hard and fast definition of the phenomenon,
but has stated:
[I] t matters a great deal ... whether the "gap" in service merely
covers a small residential cul-de-sac or whether it straddles a significant commuter highway or commuter railway. Unlike a utility such
as electrical power, cellular service is used in transit, so a gap that
covers a well-traveled road could affect large numbers of travelersand the people who are trying to communicate with them. Over the
course of a year, the total disruption caused could be quite
92
significant.
The Second Circuit has also employed a factual inquiry when addressing this issue, noting that where the interruption to service is "de
minimis" a wireless provider does not have a valid claim against the
93
municipality.
Although still undefined, the phenomenon of significant gaps
has appeared at the center of numerous legal battles between providers and municipal zoning boards. 94 Consistently, the providers have
argued that municipal zoning authorities have acted to effectively prohibit the provision of wireless service by denying applications for facilities to remedy these significant gaps, thus violating the substantive
limitations set forth in the TCA. 95 Municipalities have, not surpris96
ingly, argued against this construction of the applicable provisions.
B.

The Split

Of the circuits that have addressed the problem of significant
gaps in light of the TCA mandates, each has applied a different stan91
92
93
94

360' Commun. Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 211 F.3d 79, 87 (4th Cir. 2000).
Cellular Tel. Co. v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d 64, 70 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999).
Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1999).
See infra Part III.B.

95

See infra Part III.B.

96

See infra Part IILB.
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dard. 9 7 As a result, seemingly similar fact patterns have inspired significantly different conclusions of law. The cases have also generated
a great deal of rhetoric in the district courts; still, no consensus seems
likely at any level unless the United States Supreme Court agrees to
hear the issue and unify the standards.
1. Foundational Cases
While literally dozens of decisions focusing on the "effect of
prohibiting" language in the prohibition clause have been handed
down across the country, a few clearly stand out as influential in shaping the circuit split. This Note will concentrate on the Second, Third,
and Fourth Circuit standards, as representing the extreme sides of debate. 98 While this Note takes the position that none of these standards is an ideal interpretation of the TCA with regard to significant
gaps in coverage, the Second Circuit standard is the most logical and
well-reasoned reading of the statute. However, the leading Second
Circuit case contains troubling dicta that, when taken to its logical
conclusion and incorporated into a standard (as recently done by the
Third Circuit), offends the letter and spirit of the TCA. 99

97 These include the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits. See Omnipoint
Commun. Enter. v. Newtown Township, 219 F.3d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 2000); Willoth, 176
F.3d at 643; Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Commun. Enter., 173 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir.
1999); AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 428 (4th Cir. 1998).
98 In fact, only one other circuit (the First) has considered the issue. In Town of
Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc., 173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999), the

provider was not trying to fill gaps but rather to introduce service to a new area. After
its applications were denied, the provider filed several claims against the zoning
board, including a claim under the prohibition clause. The court acknowledged that
a conflict existed in the circuits, specifically citing the Fourth Circuit's approach. Id.
at 14. However, rather than accepting an existing standard, the First Circuit applied a
"fixed hostility" analysis to determine if the Town's actions had the effect of prohibiting wireless service. Id. Under this analysis, "the burden for the carrier invoking
[the] provision is a heavy one: to show from language or circumstances not just that
this application has been rejected but that further reasonable efforts are so likely to be
fruitless that it is a waste of time even to try." Id. While this standard has since been
used in significant gap cases, I have chosen to narrow the discussion to the other

three circuits because the standards emerging from those circuits represent the polar
opposites of the debate on the prohibition clause and were developed specifically
with regard to the significant gap problem.
99 See infra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.

2002]

BRIDGING THE (SIGNIFICANT)

a.

GAP

The Early Decisions: Western PCS II Corp. v. Extraterritorial
Zoning Authority

Although disposed of at the district court level, the Western PCS1' °
decision is one of the earliest and most commonly referred to cases
addressing the problem of significant gaps in coverage. 10 1 The underlying dispute in Western PCS reflects the standard fact pattern for these
cases. In an attempt to close a gap in its service through a certain
corridor of Interstate 25, Western sought to place an antenna on an
existing water tank near the highway. 10 2 Western applied for a special
exception to the Extraterritorial Zoning Commission (EZC), which
recommended conditional approval. l0 3 Despite this approval, and
Western's statements that it had explored all of its alternatives, the
Extraterritorial Zoning Authority (EZA) denied Western's application
because it lacked a sufficient property interest and because local re04
sidents had not expressed a desire for the added service.'
The district court overruled the EZA, holding that the Authority's
denial of Western's application violated both the discrimination
clause and the prohibition clause of the TCA. 10 5 Noting that Western's two competitors provided uninterrupted analog service along
the 1-25 corridor in question, the court remarked that "[i]t does not
take a telecommunications engineer or a marketing expert to recognize that an inability to provide uninterrupted service along the 1-25
corridor would seriously impede Western's ability to compete with its
competitors in the Santa Fe area."' 0 6 In light of the EZA's failure to
provide a justifiable basis for its decision, the court determined that
the resulting discrimination was not reasonable within the meaning of
the provision.107
In addition, the court concluded that the EZA's decision had the
08
effect of prohibiting the provision of wireless service in the area.
100 957 F. Supp. 1230 (D.N.M. 1997).
101 See, e.g., APT Pittsburgh Ltd. v. Penn Township, 196 F.3d 469, 474 (3d Cir.
1999); AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 428 (4th Cir. 1998); APT
Minneapolis, Inc. v. Eau Claire County, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1024 (W.D. Wis. 1999);
Omnipoint Commun. Enter. v. Town of Amherst, 74 F. Supp. 2d 109, 118 (D.N.H.
1998); Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Town of N. Stonington, 12 F. Supp. 2d 247, 251 (D.
Conn. 1998).
102 W. PCS, 957 F. Supp. at 1234.
103 Id. The EZC's conditions included height restrictions and removal of existing
graffiti on the water tank. Western agreed to these conditions. Id. at 1235.
104 See id.
105 Id. at 1237.
106 Id.
107 See id. at 1238.
108 See id.
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The court based this conclusion on the fact that Western was a digital
provider, while its competitors offered only analog service. 10 9 Thus,
the EZA, in denying Western's application, was effectively prohibiting
the provision of new technology to the 1-25 corridor and the surrounding area.1 10
The language and the reasoning in Western PCS have been influential in other courts throughout the country, representing what appears to be the outcome most consistent with the meaning and
purpose of the TCA. 111 However, not all courts have followed the
logic of the Western PCS decision, choosing instead to interpret the
112
TCA narrowly in favor of municipal zoning authorities.
b.

The Fourth Circuit "General Ban" Standard: AT&T Wireless
PCS, Inc. v. Virginia Beach

One year after Western PCS was decided in New Mexico, on the
other side of the country the Fourth Circuit handed down another
influential decision. 113 Employing a completely conflicting interpretation of the TCA provisions, the Virginia Beach decision ushered in a
new wave of decisions upholding municipal zoning board decisions
preventing carriers from filling gaps in their coverage.
The Virginia Beach case arose out of a dispute involving PWS providers AT&T and PrimeCo's proposal to construct two 135-foot towers
at a church in a residential area of the town. 114 Both providers offered digital service in the Virginia Beach area and intended the two
towers to help fill a gap in the coverage area for the surrounding
neighborhood.'1 5 After arranging for a lease with the Church, the
parties applied to the City for a conditional use permit.' 16 The area in
which the plaintiffs sought to construct their facilities was characterized by little commercial development, and citizens were concerned
with the aesthetic impact of the proposed construction.1 1 7 After a
brief hearing on the proposal at which citizens expressed these con109
110
111

See id. at 1237-38.
See id. at 1238.
See infra Part IV.

112
113

See infra notes 113-29 and accompanying text.
AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998).

114 Id. at 424.
115 Id. at 425. In addition, the application included a co-location proposal for
fellow carriers GTE Mobilnet and 3600 Communications to supply analog service
from the two towers. Id.

116
117

Id.
Id. This "Not In My Back Yard" or "NIMBY" phenomenon is common to much

of the litigation surrounding § 332. See, e.g., Malcolm J. Tuesley, Note, Not in My
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cerns, the City Council of Virginia Beach voted unanimously to deny
the providers' application.1 1 8
The Fourth Circuit found in favor of the City Council based on a
narrow interpretation of § 332. First, the court found that the City
Council's decision did not violate the discrimination clause of the
TCA because the decision, even if discriminatory, was not unreasonable.1 1 9 Because four providers were involved in the application, the
court reasoned that the City Council could not have discriminated
against "functionally equivalent" providers by refusing to grant the application to all the providers involved.1 20 In addition, the court noted
that "the Act explicitly contemplates that some discrimination 'among
providers of functionally equivalent services' is allowed."' 21 Because
the contemplated discrimination need only be reasonable, the court
held that the City Council was justified in refusing the permit on aes22
thetic grounds.
The court then turned to a discussion of the prohibition clause,
which the court construed as applying only to general bans and not
individual decisions. 123 The court reasoned that a broader reading
would require zoning boards to approve all applications, thus negating the Act's express preservation of local authority. 124 Because the
City Council had not imposed a general ban on wireless service, the
25
court found that the denial did not violate the prohibition clause.
Backyard: The Siting of Wireless Communications Facilities, 51 FED. COMm. L.J. 887, 897
(1999).
118 Va. Beach, 155 F.3d at 425.
119 See id. at 427.
120 See id.
121 Id.
122 See id.
123 See id. at 428.
124 See id. The court also stated that, contrary to the providers' arguments, a narrow reading would not strip the Act of its effect because a city would still be prevented
from imposing moratoria on siting applications. In addition, in an unexplained twist
of logic, the court argued that the narrow reading would actually serve to further the
competitive goals of the Act "by strengthening the hand of new market entrants who
cannot show that they have been unreasonably discriminated against." Id.
125 Accord Cellco P'ship v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 3 F. Supp. 2d 178, 185
(D. Conn. 1998); Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 995 F. Supp. 52, 57-58
(D. Conn. 1998). But cf Va. Metronet, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 984 F. Supp. 966,
971 &n.6 (E.D. Va. 1998) (endorsing the Fourth Circuit reading but applying a rigorous review standard to overturn the zoning board's decision, finding that the prohibition clause also encompasses "facially neutral" policies that "may also have the effect
of prohibiting service if those policies serve merely as a pretense to mask arbitrary
decision making").
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Not only does the Virginia Beach decision ignore the logic of West26
ern PCS, the court seems to have ignored the mandates of the TCA.1
If anything, the prohibition clause does not contemplate the "general
ban" standard. Not only does this narrow reading render the second
half of the clause redundant, 127 but application of the general ban
standard promises to stifle competition in local markets. 128 As such,
[e]vidence that a particular geographic area cannot be served by
existing, surrounding sites and must be served by a new site within
that same geographic area, coupled with evidence that the location
of the proposed facility is the best or only location available to provide such service, should be enough to sustain the prohibition
129
argument.
Evidently, the Fourth Circuit was unwilling to accept this reasoning in
Virginia Beach.
c.

The Second Circuit "Least Intrusive Means" Standard:
Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth

What the Fourth Circuit missed in Virginia Beach, the Second Circuit recognized in Willoth. 130 Most courts dealing with
§ 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II) already recognized that a blanket ban or moratorium was directly contrary to the spirit and the language of the
TCA;' 3 1 however, the issues at stake in significant gap cases require a
more in-depth analysis of the meaning of the provision. Rather than
simply extending the logic applying to moratoria, as the Virginia Beach
court did, the Second Circuit undertook this analysis and "adopted a
13 2
common sense interpretation of the legislation."
The dispute concerned Sprint's proposed construction of three
150-foot towers in the Ontario, New York area.1 33 Sprint presented its
proposal for the three cell sites to the Town Planning Board (Town)
126

Interestingly, the Virginia Beach court distinguished the facts in Western PCS,

noting that the area in question in that case had been zoned for commercial use. See
Va. Beach, 155 F.3d at 428. However, the Western PCS decision did not turn at all on
this fact. Rather, the Western PCS court concentrated on the important issue, namely
that the EZA's decision was anti-competitive and thus counter to the stated goals of
the TCA. See Western PCS II Corp. v. Extraterritorial Zoning Auth., 957 F. Supp.
1230, 1237-38 (D.N.M. 1997).

127
128

See supra Part II.A.
See infra note 143 and accompanying text.

129
130

Baldwin, supra note 21, at 560.
Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630 (2d Cir. 1999).

131

See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.

132 Yesawich & Riley, supra note 89, at 21.
133 Willoth, 176 F.3d at 635.
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and submitted applications for site plan approval.13 4 Over the course
of several public hearings and meetings, the Town reviewed the applications, assessed the environmental impact of the proposed towers,
and considered other possible arrangements including reducing the
number and lowering the height of the proposed towers.1 3 5 In the
end, the Town denied the application due to the environmental im13 6
pact assessment.
Although the Second Circuit ruled in favor of the Town, the Willoth decision is interesting because the court applied an entirely new
test for determining whether a zoning decision violated the TCA. Following the standard analysis, the court first considered Sprint's unreasonable discrimination claim, holding that the Town did not act
unreasonably in requiring Sprint to undergo more probing inquiries
than other carriers in the area.' 3 7 The Willoth court noted the legislative history, stating that "local governments may reasonably take the
location of the telecommunications tower into consideration" when
reviewing an application, "even though this may result in discrimina138
tion between providers of functionally equivalent services."
However, the more revolutionary aspect of the court's analysis is
its treatment of Sprint's claim under the prohibition clause. While
the court dismissed Sprint's argument that a planning board does not
have the authority to deny a provider's proposal for towers that the
provider has deemed necessary, 39 the court also balked at approving
the Town's argument that the prohibition clause referred only to general policies banning wireless service. 140 The court stated that this interpretation, based on the VirginiaBeach decision, "would... render
141
the language 'or have the effect of prohibiting' . . . duplicative."
Reading the separate provisions of § 332 together, the court reasoned
that accepting the Fourth Circuit's interpretation would not only
render the second part of § 332 (c) (7) (B) (i) (II) superfluous, but also
134 Id.
135 Id. at 635-36.
136 Id. at 636.
137 Id. at 639.
138 Id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 222).
139 See id. at 639-40. The court correctly noted that the TCA does not contemplate mandatory approval of all applications for tower construction. Id. Additionally,
the court reasoned that "mandating approval of all wireless facilities would act as a
disincentive for wireless service providers to develop and deploy new technology that
will provide better transmission and reception with less intrusive towers, effectively
undermining the TCA's goal of increased innovation." Id. at 640.
140 See id. at 640.
141 Id.
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much of the following text of the provision.1 4 2 According to the Second Circuit, the "untenable" result of the "general ban" interpretation
would be "that once personal wireless services are available somewhere within the jurisdiction of a state or local government, whether
by virtue of a facility located outside or inside its borders, the state or
local government could deny any further applications with impunity."1 43 Such a scenario would undermine the intended goals of the
TCA.

x4 4

After an exhaustive discussion of the meaning of "personal wireless service," the Willoth court concluded that the best interpretation
of the prohibition clause falls somewhere in between the two parties'
proposed interpretations. 145 Based on its own construction, the court
held that "local governments must allow service providers to fill gaps
14 6
in the ability of wireless telephones to have access to land lines."
However, the court tempered this mandate by preserving a municipality's power to deny applications if the proposed construction is not the
least intrusive means of filling the gap.' 47 In this way, the court acknowledged the balance between competing interests attempted by
the TCA.
While the Second Circuit's holding seems to correctly reflect all
aspects of the TCA, the decision includes some questionable dicta. In
explaining how the "least intrusive means" standard preserves local
authority, the court wrote that
once an area is sufficiently serviced by a wireless service provider,
the right to deny applications becomes broader: State and local governments may deny subsequent applications without thereby violating subsection B(i) (II). The right to deny applications will still be
tempered by subsection B (i) (I), which prohibits unreasonable discrimination. However, it is not unreasonably discriminatory to deny
a subsequent application for a cell site that is substantially more intrusive than existing cell sites by virtue of its structure, placement or
1 48
cumulative impact.

142

See id.

143

Id. at 641. As time has shown, the Willoth court was dead-on in predicting the
result of applying the "general ban" test. See infra Part II.B.2.
144

See Willoth, 176 F.3d at 641.

145
146

Id.
Id. at 643.

147

Id. The court reiterated this preservation of municipal power in its stated

holding: "We hold only that the Act's ban on prohibiting personal wireless services
precludes denying an application for a facility that is the least intrusive means for
closing a significant gap in a remote user's ability to reach a cell site that provides
access to land lines." Id.
148 Id.
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Unfortunately, the court's standard disintegrates a bit with this language. If this statement is relied upon as forming part of the standard, the standard becomes as anti-competitive as if the court had
accepted the ruling in Virginia Beach. This result is evident in the way
the Third Circuit has approached the problem of significant gaps.
2.

The Third Circuit Approach: Ho-Ho-Kus to Newtown Township

While the Second and Fourth Circuits have maintained relatively
consistent positions on the correct standard applicable to the significant gap problem, 49 the Third Circuit has subtly changed its initial
position through subsequent decisions. While the changes were ostensibly subtle, the practical effect of these later cases has been to alter
the effect on providers dramatically.
a.

Cellular Telephone Co. v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus

Shortly after the Virginia Beach and Willoth decisions were issued,
the Third Circuit was given an opportunity to throw in its two cents on
the significant gaps/prohibition clause debate. In Cellular Telephone
Co. v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus,'50 the court expressly accepted the Willoth
reasoning when it held that "local officials must always insure that
neither their general policies nor their individual decisions prohibit or
have the effect of prohibiting personal wireless services."' 51 The court
went on to
interpret this mandate to mean more than simply ensuring that personal wireless services are available somewhere within the relevant
jurisdiction, even if they are not available throughout. Thus [it]
conclude [d], as did the [Willoth court], that local zoning policies
and decisions have the effect of prohibiting wireless communication

services if they result in "significant gaps" in the availability of wire152
less services.
Ultimately, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision
in favor of the Borough and remanded the case for reconsideration of
the proposed facility. In doing so, the court noted that the inquiry
involved the two-prong test set out in Willoth; namely whether signifi149 See, e.g., 360' Commun. Co.v. Bd. of Supervisors, 211 F.3d 79, 86-87 (4th Cir.
2000) (acknowledging the hypothetical feasibility of First Circuit hostility standard,
but outright rejecting the Second and Third Circuit standards in favor of continuing

the general ban standard).
150 197 F.3d 64 (3d Cir. 1999).
151

Id. at 70 (emphasis added).

152

Id.
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cant gaps exist and, if so, whether the providers' proposal "is the least
153
intrusive means of filling those gaps."

b.

APT Pittsburgh, Ltd. v. Penn Township

Just five months after the Third Circuit reached its decision in
Ho-Ho-Kus, the court handed down another decision in which "[i]t
purported to agree with Willoth generally, but actually gutted the
[S]econd [C]ircuit's standard" 154 by extracting and adopting the Willoth court's dicta that a broader right to deny applications exists once
155
an area is served by a wireless provider.
In APT Pittsburgh,APT submitted a proposal for the construction
of a tower to help fill a gap in coverage along Route 8.156 Because of
the topography in the area, APT needed to construct a sufficiently tall
tower to supply effective service. 157 After a three-month investigation
of potential sites, APT entered into a lease with a private resident and
158
submitted an application for a variance to the local zoning board.
The board denied the application, and APT filed suit alleging, inter
alia, violation of the prohibition clause.1 59
In addressing this claim, the Third Circuit returned to a discussion of the Willoth standard. After noting that the TCA neither gave a
provider a "wildcard that would trump any adverse zoning decision,"'160 nor stripped a provider of that ability to challenge an individual zoning decision, the court quoted extensively from the Willoth
decision by way of introducing the two-pronged, least intrusive means
standard.' 6 ' As in Ho-Ho-Kus, the Court ostensibly endorsed the Willoth standard; however, the Third Circuit went further than it had in
Ho-Ho-Kus and held that a zoning board's decision may not have the
effect of prohibiting service if another provider already serves the area
in question. 162 In its decision, the court wrote that
the provider must show that its facility will fill an existing significant
gap in the ability of remote users to access the national telephone
network. In this context, the relevant gap, if any, is a gap in the
service available to remote users.... The provider's showing on
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id. at 76.
196 F.3d 469 (3d Cir. 1999).
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
APT Pittsburgh, 196 F.3d at 472.
Id.
Id.

159
160

Id. at 473, 478.
Id. at 479.

161

See id. at 479-80.

162

See id. at 480.
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this issue will thus have to include evidence that the area the new
163
facility will serve is not already served by another provider.

As APT had not submitted evidence that other providers were not already servicing the Route 8 corridor, the court held that APT had not
16 4
met its burden.
The practical effect of the Third Circuit standard as developed in
the APT Pittsburghdecision is best illustrated by its application to the
facts in another recent Third Circuit decision, Omnipoint Communica165
tions Enterprises, L.P. v. Newtown Township.
c.

Omnipoint CommunicationsEnterprises,L.P. v. Newtown
Township

The facts underlying the dispute in Newtown Township follow the
now-familiar format. Because of a gap in its service in the Newtown
area, Omnipoint entered into a lease with the owner of Newtown Towers, an apartment complex, to install an antenna on the building's
rooftop. 16 6 Omnipoint applied for a building permit, which was denied. 167 Omnipoint appealed the decision to the local zoning hearing
board, which again denied the application. Thus, Omnipoint sued
the Township. 168
When the case reached the Third Circuit, the court took an interesting approach in construing the question at the heart of the dispute.
The court wrote that "[t] he question in this case is whether a decision
which creates a gap in one cellular provider's service violates section
332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II) when other providers serve the area."'169 The
court focused on the effect of a gap on consumers, noting that "the
doctrine prohibiting gaps is designed to protect the users, not the carriers." 170 With this in mind, the court reasoned that if one carrier is
able to provide seamless coverage, then a zoning board decision
preventing another carrier from filling its gap does not have the effect
of prohibiting the provision of wireless service. 71' In other words,
under the Third Circuit "single provider" standard, "a finding of pro163 Id.
164 Id. at 481.
165
166

219 F.3d 240 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 985 (2000).
Id. at 242.

167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 244.
170 Id.
171 See id.
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hibition under the Act requires proof that all carriers are without ser172
vice in a given area, not just the carrier asserting the claim."
IV.

ANALYsis

By transforming the "least intrusive means" standard into a "single provider" standard, the court in Newtown Township did an injustice
to the Willoth standard, which it purported to apply, and to the language and meaning of the TCA itself. First, the holding and reasoning of the Willoth decision directly contravenes such a "single
provider" application of the standard. Like the "general ban" standard, which the Willoth court flatly rejected, the Newtown Township
"single provider" standard would allow state or local governments to
deny applications "with impunity" once a single provider has made
services "available somewhere within the jurisdiction."1 7 3 This is exactly the result that the Willoth court dismissed as "untenable."1 74 In
addition, preventing more than one carrier from achieving seamless
service in a given area frustrates the competitive goals of the TCA. As
stated by Omnipoint counsel:
If only one carrier is allowed in each municipality, the country will
be divided up like a multicolored mosaic with a random pattern,
where some users will have service only on the blue tiles, some only
on the red, some only on the green, some only on the yellow, and so
on. An uninterrupted conversation would be nearly impossible as a
user travels throughout a given region and moves into and out of
1 75
the areas serviced by different carriers.
Thus, not only would the "single provider" standard prevent one
provider from achieving seamless coverage, the standard potentially
prevents any provider from achieving seamless coverage, leaving no
provider with a competitive edge over the others. On a much smaller
level, the "single provider" standard grants the first provider to
achieve seamless coverage in a municipality a de facto monopoly on
wireless service in that area. Reiterating what the district court found
so obvious in Western PCS, "[i] t does not take a telecommunications
engineer or a marketing expert to recognize that an inability to provide uninterrupted service" in a given area "would seriously impede [a
76
provider's] ability to compete with its competitors."
172
173

Omnipoint Petition, supra note 17, at 8.
Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 641 (2d Cir. 1999).

174

Id.

175 Omnipoint Peitition, supra note 17, at 13.
176 W. PGS II Corp. v. Extraterritorial Zoning Auth., 957 F. Supp. 1230, 1237
(D.N.M. 1997).
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Furthermore, the "single provider" standard does not serve its
stated purpose of protecting consumers. 177 On an economic level, a
lack of competition in a given municipality will affect both prices and
service. As the Willoth court rightly noted, "mandating approval of all
wireless facilities would act as a disincentive for wireless service providers to develop and deploy new technology that will provide better
transmission and reception with less intrusive towers, effectively undermining the TCA's goal of increased innovation. 17 8 The same
logic presumably holds true where a lack of competition is created,
not by mandated entry, but by an effective monopoly.
In addition, the "single provider" standard fails to recognize the
technological requirements of wireless service. As such, a situation in
which consumers are forced to choose between seamless analog service, or advanced service marred by significant gaps in coverage, is not
entirely unthinkable. If,for example, the first provider to achieve
what in a court's opinion amounts to sufficient coverage happens to
utilize only analog technology, consumers may find themselves weighing two entirely unattractive options.
Finally, the "single provider" standard fails to take into account
the very realistic fact that even if one provider is capable of providing
100% seamless coverage, remote subscribers to different services traveling through the area, or even local subscribers to different services,
will be unable to sustain communications when in the coverage gap.
In short, the "single provider" standard does nothing to solve the
problem of significant gaps except for those consumers who happen
to subscribe to the first provider to achieve seamless service. As one of
Omnipoint's lawyers in the Newtown Township case remarked, "[i]f
your car breaks down somewhere where there is a gap in your wireless
service, it won't matter that there is another service provider in that
area. That person will be unable to call for help, and that is unfortunate." I79 In the end, the- "single provider" standard serves neither
consumers nor providers.
Still, recognizing that the TCA does preserve a municipality's
right to control zoning decisions, subject to the limitations in
§ 332 (c) (7) (B), the correct reading of the prohibition clause cannot
be that municipalities must always allow all providers to remedy significant gaps in coverage, irregardless of zoning concerns. 180 How is the
177 See supra notes 175-76.
178 Willoth, 176 F.3d at 640.
179

Chani Katzen, Supreme Court Won't Hear Case of Disputed Phone Tower in Newtown
INQUIRER, Nov. 7, 2000, 2000 WL 28949688.
See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (Supp. V 1999).

Township, Pa., PHILA.
180
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balance preserved? The simple answer can be found by reading the
prohibition clause and the unreasonable discrimination clause in conjunction with each other. 18 1 For all of the reasons contained herein,
the language and history of the TCA anticipate more than one provider being able to offer coverage in any given area. However, a municipality may not be acting "unreasonably" in turning down the third,
fourth, or fifth provider that submits an application to fill significant
gaps if the market is saturated, and all other carriers provide seamless
or near-seamless coverage. Thus, the unreasonable discrimination
82
clause serves to temper the application of the prohibition clause.'
In this way, the interests of providers, consumers, and municipalities
are served.
CONCLUSION

The TCA represents a breakthrough attempt by Congress to
streamline the delivery of PWS and other technologies to the American public by encouraging competition within the market. However,
Congress's efforts continue to be impaired as disputes between providers and municipalities prevent the development of seamless service
and the introduction of new technology in many areas of the United
States. These problems could be alleviated by a simple interpretation
and application of the TCA, based on the legislative history and the
plain meaning of the Act. The Second Circuit's standard introduced
by the Willoth decision is the most accurate interpretation currently
available and should be accepted by the other circuits as the best compromise between municipalities and providers. By accepting such a
balanced interpretation, the courts will be able to give effect to the
TCA so that the American telecommunications industry will be able to
provide quality service to consumers.
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Seeid. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i).
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